To the Extent Practicable

In federal fisheries management, a lot can depend on one phrase: “to the extent practicable.” It sounds reasonable. But, in Alaska, it is often the place where strong conservation actions are softened, delayed, or narrowed until they no longer match the scale of the problem.

That phrase “to the extent practicable” appears in the regulations governing bycatch and habitat. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), National Standard 9 (NS9) requires managers to reduce bycatch as much as possible (i.e. practicable) and to minimize bycatch mortality when avoiding it is not feasible. National Standard 8 (NS8) requires managers to consider fishing communities, but only in ways that are consistent with the Act’s conservation goals, including preventing overfishing and rebuilding fish stocks. It also directs managers to minimize negative economic impacts on fishing communities when possible (i.e. practicable). In summary, community impacts are important, but they do not take precedence over conservation responsibilities, and NS8 is not a replacement for NS9. 

In practice, however, “practicable” is being used as a shield to do less than we should. A measure that could reduce bycatch or protect habitat via increased accountability is labeled as too disruptive, too expensive, too uncertain, or too difficult to implement. Meanwhile, the costs of delay are treated as background conditions that communities are expected to absorb. Subsistence users absorb it. Small-boat fishermen absorb it. Salmon, halibut, and crab-dependent regions absorb it. Public trust absorbs it.

That is not the intended application of “practicable.”

“Practicable” should require a genuine test. Is the measure technically achievable? Can it be monitored? Can it be enforced? Does it have the potential to deliver meaningful conservation benefits, and does it balance conservation costs amongst all stakeholders? Can the fishery adapt within a reasonable timeframe? Those are the right questions. Too often, the real question becomes: what is the minimum change the system can sustain this season?

Bycatch in trawl fisheries is the clearest example. No one in Alaska started this conversation by demanding zero bycatch. That is not the legal standard, nor was it the public’s first ask. The legal standard is minimization, which means using available tools to reduce avoidable harm. For decades, Alaska communities requested smaller, practical steps first: better accountability, stronger monitoring, enforceable standards, and meaningful reductions. Too often, these requests were delayed, narrowed, or dismissed as too disruptive to current operations. The result is predictable. 

Frustration has grown over the decades, and public demands are now increasing in direct response to it. This is not because people became unreasonable; it is because the system made even modest asks seem impossible to achieve. When communities spend years asking for basic accountability and see no real results, they stop requesting minor adjustments and begin demanding structural change. That is where Alaska stands now, and the broader public is increasingly tired of accepting avoidable harm as normal.

It also means being honest about scale. A low bycatch rate presented as a percentage of the target species can still result in a large number of bycaught fish. Communities do not see bycatch as a percentage; they see it as actual salmon, halibut, crab, and other species taken from the system. “Minimizing” does not mean hiding large bycatch numbers behind low rates. If total bycatch remains high enough to cause real harm, then the standard is not being met in any meaningful way.

It also involves being honest about what the MSA requires and what it does not. The MSA does not guarantee that every business model will remain profitable or unchanged at all times. It mandates conservation and management measures that meet legal standards while taking into account the interests of fishing communities within those limits. NS8 is not a loophole to bypass NS9. It is a balancing standard within a conservation-first framework.

This matters in Alaska habitat debates, too. Federal Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) rules require regional fishery management councils and NOAA to identify EFH and minimize adverse effects from fishing as much as possible. The EFH regulations also clarify that practicability involves balancing various factors, including the nature and extent of adverse effects and the long- and short-term costs and benefits of management measures. This standard only has meaning if compliance can be verified. If a gear type is defined by not contacting the seafloor, such as pelagic or “mid-water” trawl, then compliance must be provable, not assumed. If the system cannot verify performance on the water, it requires the public to trust a rule it cannot fully enforce. That is not accountability. That is paperwork. When evidence is disputed, it calls for better monitoring and verification, not indefinite delays. 

A stronger approach is possible. Define practicability with clear criteria. Compare alternatives openly. Explain what was rejected and why. Assess long-term and cumulative impacts, not just the next season. Include monitoring and enforceability in the analysis, not as optional add-ons.

Most importantly, we must stop treating bycatch, habitat, and community impacts like separate categories. Alaska lives with the cumulative result. When bycatch remains high in absolute numbers, habitat accountability remains weak, and trust in enforcement drops, communities do not experience these as separate policy categories. They experience them all at once, as one management failure with real consequences for many species, subsistence, and working waterfronts.

For Alaska, this is not an abstract policy debate. It is about whether families can keep fishing, whether subsistence users can rely on returns, and whether the public can trust that conservation standards mean something on the water, not just on paper. “Practicable” is supposed to require hard analysis and real accountability. It is not supposed to become the default excuse for weaker action, while the costs are pushed onto the people and communities who can least afford them.